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Abstract. Provable entanglement has been shown to be a necessary precondition for unconditionally secure
key generation in the context of quantum cryptographic protocols. We estimate the maximal threshold
disturbance up to which the two legitimate users can prove the presence of quantum correlations in their
data, in the context of the four- and six-state quantum key-distribution protocols, under the assumption of
coherent attacks. Moreover, we investigate the conditions under which an eavesdropper can saturate these
bounds, by means of incoherent and two-qubit coherent attacks. A direct connection between entanglement
distillation and classical advantage distillation is also presented.
PACS. 03.67.Dd Quantum Cryptography – 03.67.Hk Quantum Communication
1 Introduction
Quantum key-distribution (QKD) protocols exploit qua-
ntum correlations in order to establish a secret key be-
tween two legitimate users (Alice and Bob). In a typi-
cal quantum cryptographic scheme, after the transmission
stage Alice and Bob must process their raw key, in or-
der to end up with identical random keys about which an
adversary (Eve) has negligible information. In principle,
classical as well as quantum algorithms (distillation pro-
tocols) can be used for this post-processing [1,2,3,4,5,6,
7,8,9,10]. In any case, it is necessary for Alice and Bob to
estimate the error rate in their sifted key, for the purpose
of detecting the presence of Eve on the channel.
An important quantity for any QKD protocol is the
threshold disturbance i.e., the maximal disturbance or
quantum bit error rate (QBER) which can be tolerated
by Alice and Bob for being capable of producing a secret
key. This threshold disturbance quantifies the robustness
of the QKD scheme under consideration against a spe-
cific eavesdropping strategy, and depends on the algorithm
that Alice and Bob are using for post-processing their raw
key. Up to date, the robustness of the four-state (BB84)
[11] and the six-state [12] QKD protocols has been mainly
discussed on the basis of the so-called Csisza´r-Ko¨rner cri-
terion [6] and/or incoherent attacks, and various bounds
have been obtained [13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21]. More-
over, it is also known that a necessary precondition for
unconditionally secure QKD is that the correlations es-
tablished between Alice and Bob during the state distri-
bution cannot be explained in the framework of separable
states (provable entanglement) [22,23]. Clearly, the thresh-
Send offprint requests to:
old disturbance up to which this precondition is satisfied
under the assumption of general coherent (joint) attacks,
quantifies the ultimate robustness bound of a particular
QKD protocol.
In a recent paper [24], we proved that for QKD pro-
tocols using two mutually unbiased bases, this threshold
disturbance for provable entanglement (robustness bound)
scales with the dimension d of the information carriers as
(d−1)/2d. Thus for the BB84 QKD protocol (d = 2) [11],
Alice and Bob always share provable entanglement for es-
timated disturbances below 1/4. Extending our studies,
in this paper it is shown that the corresponding threshold
disturbance for entanglement distillation in the context of
the six-state QKD protocol [12] is 1/3.
Our studies show that even the most powerful eaves-
dropping attacks are not able to disentangle the two legit-
imate users for estimated disturbances below these bor-
ders. In other words, Eve is not able to decrease the ro-
bustness of the protocols. The natural question arises,
however, is whether and at which cost these disentan-
glement thresholds can be attained in the framework of
eavesdropping attacks that maximize Eve’s properties (in-
formation gain and/or probability of success in guessing).
In this paper we address this open question in the context
of incoherent as well as two-qubit coherent attacks. In par-
ticular, we present evidence that in the limit of many pairs,
coherent attacks might be able to disentangle the two hon-
est parties at the lowest threshold disturbance while si-
multaneously maximizing Eve’s probability of success in
guessing correctly the transmitted signal.
This paper is organized as follows : In Section 2 we
briefly describe the prepare-and-measure as well as the
associated entanglement-based versions of the BB84 and
the six-state QKD protocols. The corresponding thresh-
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old disturbances for provable entanglement (robustness
bounds) are derived in Section 3, while in Section 4 we in-
vestigate the cost at which an eavesdropper can saturate
these bounds. A link between entanglement distillation
and classical advantage distillation protocols is discussed
in Section 5.
2 Basic facts about BB84 and six-state
protocols
For the sake of completeness, in this section we briefly
summarize basic facts about the two qubit-based QKD
protocols especially in connection with their verification-
test stage.
2.1 Prepare-and-measure schemes
In the prepare-and-measure BB84 protocol [11], Alice sends
a sequence of qubits to Bob each of which is randomly
prepared in one of the basis states { |0〉, |1〉} or { |0¯〉, |1¯〉}
which are eigenstates of two maximally conjugated physi-
cal variables, namely the two Pauli spin operators Z and
X . The eigenstates of Z, i.e. { |0〉, |1〉}, and of X , i.e.
{ |0¯〉, |1¯〉}, are related by the Hadamard transformation
H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (1)
i.e. |¯i〉 =∑j Hij |j〉 (i, j ∈ {0, 1}). In the computational
basis { |0〉, |1〉}, the Pauli spin operators are represented
by the matrices
X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.(2)
Bob measures the received qubits randomly in one of the
two bases. After the transmission stage, Alice and Bob ap-
ply a random permutation of their data and publicly dis-
cuss the bases chosen, discarding all the bits where they
have selected different bases. Subsequently, they randomly
select a number of the bits from the remaining random
key (sifted key) and determine their error probability or
QBER. If, as a result of a noisy quantum channel or of an
eavesdropper, the estimated QBER is too high the pro-
tocol is aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob perform error
correction and privacy amplification with one- or two-way
classical communication, in order to obtain a smaller num-
ber of secret and perfectly correlated random bits [1,2,3,
4,5].
The six-state prepare-and-measure scheme is quite sim-
ilar to the BB84 (four-state) scheme [12]. More precisely,
Alice and Bob use at random three bases namely, the two
bases used in the BB84 plus an additional one { |0¯〉, |1¯〉}
which corresponds to the Y Pauli operator. In analogy to
BB84, the three bases are related (up to a global phase)
via the transformation
T = 1√
2
(
1 −i
1 i
)
, (3)
i.e. |¯i〉 =∑j Tij |j〉 and |¯i〉 =∑j T 2ij |j〉 with i, j ∈ {0, 1}.
2.2 Entanglement-based schemes
It has been shown that, from the point of view of an
arbitrarily powerful eavesdropper, each one of these two
prepare-and-measure schemes is equivalent to an entangle-
ment-based QKD protocol [25,26,27,28,29,30,31] . These
latter forms of the protocols offer advantages, in particular
with respect to questions concerning their unconditional
security, and work as follows: Alice prepares each of, say
2n, entangled-qubit pairs in a particular Bell state [32], say
|Ψ−〉 ≡ 1√
2
( |0A1B〉 − |1A0B〉) (where the subscripts A,B
refer to Alice and Bob, respectively). This state is invari-
ant under any unitary transformation of the form UA⊗UB.
Alice keeps half of each pair and submits the other half
to Bob after having applied a random unitary transforma-
tion chosen either from the set {1,H} (two-basis protocol)
or from the set {1, T , T 2} (three-basis protocol).
At the end of the transmission stage, Alice announces
publicly the transformations she applied on the transmit-
ted qubits and Bob reverses all of them. At this stage,
in an ideal scenario Alice and Bob would share 2n pairs
in the state |Ψ−〉⊗2n. Due to channel noise and the pres-
ence of a possible eavesdropper, however, at the end of the
transmission stage all the 2n entangled-qubit pairs will be
corrupted. In fact, they will be entangled among them-
selves as well as with Eve’s probe. Thus, the next step for
Alice and Bob is to estimate the number of singlets among
the 2n shared pairs (alternatively to estimate the fraction
of pairs which are in error). To this end, they apply a
verification test which proceeds as follows: Firstly, Alice
and Bob permute randomly all the pairs, distributing thus
any influence of the channel noise and the eavesdropper
equally among all the pairs [4,27]. Afterwards, they ran-
domly select a number (say nc) of the pairs as check pairs,
they measure each one of them separately along a com-
mon basis and they publicly compare their outcomes. The
influence of channel noise or of an eavesdropper is thus
quantified by the average estimated QBER of the check
pairs while, assuming that the check pairs constitute a
fair sample [33], the estimated QBER applies also to the
remaining, yet unmeasured, 2n− nc pairs.
After the verification test all the check pairs are dis-
missed and, if the QBER is too high the protocol is aborted.
Otherwise, Alice and Bob apply an appropriate entan-
glement purification protocol (EPP) with classical one-
or two-way communication [8,9] on the remaining 2n −
nc pairs, in order to distill a smaller number of almost
pure entangled-qubit pairs. Finally, measuring these al-
most perfectly entangled-qubit pairs in a common basis,
Alice and Bob obtain a secret random key, about which
an adversary has negligible information.
2.3 Verification test and confidence level
In closing this introductory part of the paper let us recall
some known basic facts about the verification test which
are necessary for the subsequent discussion. The reasons
for which such a classical random sampling procedure ap-
plies to a quantum scenario have been thoroughly dis-
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cussed in the literature [4,26,27,28,29,30,31]. Briefly, the
commuting-observables idea allows us to reduce any quan-
tum eavesdropping attack (even a joint one) to a classical
probabilistic cheating strategy, for which classical proba-
bility theory can be safely applied [26,29]. Furthermore,
Eve does not know in advance which pairs will be used for
quality checks and which pairs will contribute to the fi-
nal key. Thus she is not able to treat them differently and
the check pairs constitute a fair [33] classical random sam-
ple of all the pairs [4,26,27]. By invoking the verification
test therefore the two legitimate users can be confident
that (with high probability) the estimated error rate is
also the error rate they would have measured if they were
able to perform a Bell measurement projecting their pairs
onto a 2n-pair Bell basis [26,29,30]. The confidence level
is determined by classical random sampling theory [34].
In particular, the conditional probability that the verifi-
cation test is passed given that Alice and Bob underesti-
mate the error rate in their pairs is exponentially small
in the sample-size nc (i.e, ∼ 2−nc) [26,29]. In other words
the probability that Eve cheats successfully can be made
arbitrarily small by choosing a sufficiently large sample.
3 Provable entanglement and threshold
disturbances
According to a recent observation, a necessary precon-
dition for secret key distillation is that the correlations
established between Alice and Bob during the state dis-
tribution cannot be explained by a separable state [22,
23]. Throughout this work, we consider that Alice and
Bob focus on the sifted key during the post-processing
(i.e., they discard immediately all the polarization data for
which they have used different bases) and that they treat
each pair independently. Thus, according to the aforemen-
tioned precondition, given a particular value of the es-
timated QBER (observable), the task of Alice and Bob
is to infer whether they share provable entanglement or
not. Thereby, entanglement is considered to be provable
if Alice’s and Bob’s correlations cannot be explained by
a separable state within the framework of the protocols
(including post-processing) and observables under consid-
eration.
Recently [24], for the same post-processing, we esti-
mated the threshold disturbance for provable entangle-
ment in the context of two-basis qudit-based QKD pro-
tocols under the assumption of joint eavesdropping at-
tacks. In particular, we showed that for estimated distur-
bances below (d − 1)/2d (where d is the size of the in-
formation carriers), Alice and Bob can be confident that
they share provable entanglement with probability expo-
nentially close to one (see Section 2.3). In this section, for
the sake of completeness, we briefly recapitulate the main
steps of our proof adapted to the BB84 scheme. Subse-
quently, along the same lines, we estimate the correspond-
ing threshold disturbance for the six-state QKD scheme.
For the sake of consistency, we will adopt the entangle-
ment-based versions of the protocols. We would like to
stress, however, that the estimated threshold disturbances
characterize both versions of the protocols.
3.1 BB84 protocol
Given the unitarity and hermiticity of H, the average dis-
turbance (average error probability per qubit pair), that
Alice and Bob estimate during the verification test is given
by [4,24,27]
D =
1
2nc
∑
b=0,1
nc∑
ji;i=1
TrA,B
{[HbAB P HbAB]ji ρAB
}
, (4)
with the projector [35]
Pji =
∑
l=0,1
|lA, lB〉〈lA, lB| = |Φ+〉〈Φ+| + |Φ−〉〈Φ−| , (5)
and HbAB ≡ HbA ⊗ HbB. The last equality in (5) indicates
that the verification test is nothing more than a quality-
check test of the fidelity of the 2n pairs with respect to
the ideal state |Ψ−〉⊗2n [4,26,27,28,29,30,31]. The state
ρAB in Eq. (4) denotes the reduced density operator of
Alice and Bob for all 2n pairs while the index ji indi-
cates that the corresponding physical observable refers to
the ji-th randomly selected qubit pair. The powers of the
Hadamard transformations Hb, with b ∈ {0, 1}, reflect the
fact that the errors in the sifted key originate from mea-
surements in both complementary bases which have been
selected randomly by Alice and Bob with equal probabil-
ities.
As we mentioned in Section 2.3 one of the crucial cor-
nerstones for the unconditional security of the protocol is
that Eve does not know in advance which pairs will be
used for quality checks and which pairs will contribute
to the final key. Thus she is not able to treat them dif-
ferently and the check pairs constitute a classical ran-
dom sample of all the pairs [4,26,27,28]. To ensure such
a homogenization, Alice and Bob permute all of their
pairs randomly before the verification stage. In view of
this homogenization, the eavesdropping attack (although
a joint one) becomes symmetric on all the pairs [4,27]
i.e., ρ
(1)
AB = ρ
(2)
AB = · · · = ρ(2n)AB . Here, the reduced den-
sity operator of Alice’s and Bob’ s k-th pair is denoted by
ρ
(k)
AB = Tr
( 6k)
AB(ρAB) and Tr
( 6k)
AB indicates the tracing (aver-
aging) procedure over all the qubit pairs except the k-th
one. Accordingly, the average estimated disturbance (4)
reads [24]
D =
1
2
1∑
b=0
Tr
(j1)
A,B
{[
(HbA ⊗HbB) P (HbA ⊗HbB)
]
j1
ρ
(j1)
AB
}
(6)
where Tr
(j1)
A,B denotes the tracing procedure over the j1-
th qubit pair of Alice and Bob. So, an arbitrary eaves-
dropping attack which gives rise to a particular reduced
single-pair state ρ
(j1)
AB is indistinguishable, from the point
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of view of the estimated average disturbance, from a cor-
responding collective (individual) attack which results in
a decorrelated 2n-pair state of the form
⊗2n
j=1 ρ
(j)
AB.
Our purpose now is to estimate the threshold distur-
bance Dth such that for any estimated D < Dth Alice and
Bob can be confident that their correlations cannot have
emerged from a separable state. To this end let us explore
the symmetries underlying the observable under consid-
eration i.e., the estimated average QBER. According to
Eqs. (6) and (5), D is invariant under the transformations
(l, b)→ (l ⊕2 1, b),
(l, b)→ (l, b⊕2 1), (7)
where ⊕2 denotes addition modulo 2. This invariance im-
plies that the reduced density operators ρ
(j1)
AB and
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
1
8
∑
g∈G1,h∈G2
U(h)U(g)ρ
(j1)
ABU(g)
†U(h)† (8)
give rise to the same observed value of the QBER [24].
The unitary and hermitian operators appearing in Eq.
(8) form unitary representations of two discrete Abelian
groups G1 = {g1, g2, g3, g4} and G2 = {h1, h2}, and are
given by
U(g1) = XA ⊗XB, U(g2) = ZA ⊗ZB,
U(g3) = −YA ⊗ YB, U(g4) = 1A ⊗ 1B, (9)
and
U(h1) = HA ⊗HB, U(h2) = 1A ⊗ 1B. (10)
Moreover, invariance of the average QBER under the sym-
metry transformations of Eq. (7) induces invariance of
ρ˜
(j1)
AB under both discrete Abelian groups G1 and G2.
The key point is now that ρ
(j1)
AB and ρ˜
(j1)
AB differ by local
unitary operations and convex summation. Thus the den-
sity operator ρ
(j1)
AB is entangled if ρ˜
(j1)
AB is entangled. Our
main problem of determining the values of the QBER for
which Alice and Bob share provable entanglement can be
reduced therefore to the estimation of the values of D for
which the most general two-qubit state ρ˜
(j1)
AB (which is in-
variant under both Abelian discrete groups) is entangled.
The hermitian operators U(g1) and U(g2) of the group
G1 constitute already a complete set of commuting oper-
ators in the Hilbert space of two qubits and the corre-
sponding eigenstates are the Bell states [32]. Thus, the
most general two-qubit state which is invariant under the
Abelian group G1 is given by
ρ˜
(j1)
AB = λ00 |Φ+〉〈Φ+| + λ10 |Φ−〉〈Φ−|
+ λ01 |Ψ+〉〈Ψ+| + λ11 |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−| , (11)
with λαβ ≥ 0 and ∑
α,β∈{0,1}
λαβ = 1, (12)
while additional invariance under the discrete group G2
implies that
λ01 = λ10. (13)
Thus, the state (11) with the constraint (13) is the most
general two-qubit state invariant under the Abelian groups
G1 and G2.
For later convenience let us rewrite the state ρ˜
(j1)
AB in
the computational basis, i.e.
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
1
2


D 0 0 G
0 F H 0
0 H F 0
G 0 0 D

 , (14)
with F = 1 − D denoting the so-called fidelity, i.e. the
total probability for Bob to receive the submitted signal
undisturbed. Furthermore, the remaining parameters are
given by
D = λ00 + λ10, F = λ01 + λ11,
G = λ00 − λ10, H = λ01 − λ11, (15)
with D denoting the disturbance (QBER). In general, the
parameters G and H can be expressed in terms of the
overlaps between different states of Eve’s probe and are
thus intimately connected to the eavesdropping strategy.
The key point for the subsequent discussion, is that for the
estimation of the threshold disturbance it is not required
to know the explicit form of the “macroscopic” parameters
G and H and their detailed dependences on Eve’s attack.
More precisely, using Eqs. (15), the constraints (12) and
(13) read
F +D = 1 (16)
F +H = D −G (17)
respectively, while non-negativity of the eigenvalues λαβ
implies
D ≥ |G|, (18)
F ≥ |H |. (19)
The possible values of the estimated disturbance for
which ρ˜
(j1)
AB is entangled can be estimated by means of the
fully-entangled fraction (see [24]) or the Peres-Horodecki
criterion [36]. Using the latter, we have that ρ˜
(j1)
AB is sepa-
rable if and only if the inequalities
D ≥ |H |, (20)
F ≥ |G|, (21)
are satisfied. As depicted in Fig. 1, these last inequalities
combined with inequalities (18), (19) and Eqs. (16), (17)
imply that the symmetrized state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is entangled if and
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D
1.0
0 0.25−0.5 −0.25−0.75−1.0 1.00.750.5
0.75
0.25
H
b
a
d
b
a
c
Fig. 1. BB84 protocol: Region of the independent parameters
D(QBER) and H for which the two-qubit state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separa-
ble (shaded region). The various constraints that these param-
eters satisfy are indicated by straight dotted lines. Specifically,
(a) Eq. (20); (b) Eq. (19); (c) Eqs. (18) and (16), (17); (d) Eqs.
(21) and (16), (17). The protocol operates in the region which
is defined by the solid lines.
anly if the estimated QBER is below 1/4 or above 3/4.
Given, however, that the states ρ˜
(j1)
AB and ρ
(j1)
AB are related
via local operations and convex summation, the original
single-pair state ρ
(j1)
AB must also be entangled in the same
regime of parameters. Moreover, the probability that the
QBER has been underestimated during the verification
test is exponentially small in nc (see Section 2.3 and re-
lated references). Hence we may conclude that, whenever
Alice and Bob detect an average QBER below 1/4 (or
above 3/4), they can be confident that they share en-
tanglement with probability exponentially close to one
(∼ 1 − 2−nc), and their correlations cannot have origi-
nated from a separable state. The necessary precondition
for secret-key distillation is therefore fulfilled for estimated
disturbances within these intervals.
On the contrary, for 1/4 ≤ D ≤ 3/4 we have that
ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable. Of course, this does not necessarily im-
ply that ρ
(j1)
AB is also separable. But it does indicate that
in this regime of parameters, Alice’s and Bob’s correla-
tions within the framework of the BB84 protocol can be
explained by a separable state, namely by ρ˜
(j1)
AB . So, ac-
cording to [22,23], this implies that Alice and Bob can-
not extract a secret key and must abort the protocol.
From now on we focus on the regime of practical interest
(F ≥ D), where the lowest possible threshold disturbance
(Dth = 1/4) is attained for G = H = −1/4.
3.2 Six-state protocol
The threshold disturbances for the six-state protocol can
be determined in the same way. In this case, however, all
three bases are used with the same probabilities and thus
the average estimated disturbance (QBER) reads
D =
1
3
2∑
b=0
Tr
(j1)
A,B
{[
(T bA ⊗ T bB) P (T b†A ⊗ T b†B )
]
j1
ρ
(j1)
AB
}
(22)
where the unitary (but not hermitian) transformation T
is defined in Eq. (3).
In analogy to the BB84 protocol, exploiting the sym-
metries underlying Eq. (22) one finds that D is invariant
under the transformations
(l, b)→ (l ⊕2 1, b),
(l, b)→ (l, b⊕3 1),
(l, b)→ (l, b⊕3 2), (23)
with ⊕3 denoting addition modulo 3. Furthermore, the
invariance of D under the transformations (23) implies
that the reduced density operators ρ
(j1)
AB and
ρ˜
(j1)
AB =
1
12
∑
g∈G1,t∈G3
U(t)U(g)ρ
(j1)
ABU(g)
†U(t)† (24)
yield the same average QBER. This latter state is invari-
ant under the discrete Abelian groups G1 [with elements
given in Eq. (9)] and G3 = {t1, t2, t3} with elements
U(t1) = TA ⊗ TB,
U(t2) = T 2A ⊗ T 2B ,
U(t3) = 1A ⊗ 1B. (25)
The most general two-qubit state invariant under the Abelian
groups G1 and G3 is now of the form (11), with
λ00 = λ10 = λ01. (26)
Thus, in the computational basis ρ˜
(j1)
AB is given by (14)
with
D = 2λ00, F = λ11 + λ00,
G = 0, H = λ00 − λ11. (27)
Accordingly, condition (17) now reads
F +H = D, (28)
while non-negativity of the eigenvalues λαβ implies in-
equality (19) only. Finally, applying the Peres-Horodecki
criterion one finds that ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable if and only if
inequality (20) is satisfied.
As a consequence of Eqs. (16), (28) and G = 0, there is
only one macroscopic independent parameter in our prob-
lem, say H , while combining inequalities (19) and (20)
with Eqs. (16) and (28) we obtain that the reduced den-
sity operator ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separable iff 1/3 ≤ D ≤ 2/3 (Fig.
2). That is, no matter how powerful the eavesdropper is,
Alice and Bob share always provable entanglement for es-
timated disturbances smaller than 1/3. The lowest disen-
tanglement border for the six-state scheme (Dth = 1/3)
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D
1.0
0−0.5 −0.25−0.75−1.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0
1/3
H
2/3
b b
a
c
a
Fig. 2. Six-state protocol: Region of the parameters
D(QBER) and H for which the two-qubit state ρ˜
(j1)
AB is separa-
ble (thick solid line). The various constraints that these param-
eters satisfy are indicated by straight dotted lines. Specifically,
(a) Eq. (20); (b) Eq. (19); (c) Eqs. (16) and (28). The protocol
operates along the solid lines.
is attained for H = −1/3. It is also worth noting that, in
contrast to BB84, in the six-state protocol there is only
one disentanglement threshold since for D > 2/3 the pro-
tocol is not valid.
As expected, the bound for the six-state protocol is
higher than the one for the BB84 protocol. In fact, as a
consequence of the high symmetry of the six-state proto-
col, the disentanglement area of the BB84 scheme (shaded
region in Fig. 1) shrinks to a line in Fig. 2 (thick line). As
will be seen later on, this “degeneracy” affects significantly
the options of a potential eavesdropper in the framework
of the six-state protocol, increasing thus the robustness of
the protocol.
4 The price of disentanglement
In QKD issues, Eve’s attack is usually optimized by maxi-
mizing her Shannon information (or the probability of her
guessing correctly Alice’s bit-string) conditioned on a fixed
disturbance. Given, however, that the unconditional secu-
rity of the BB84 and six-state cryptographic schemes is
beyond doubt, Eve might be willing to reduce the robust-
ness of the protocols to the lowest possible level while si-
multaneously maximizing any of her properties [19]. Thus,
what remains to be clarified now is the cost at which Eve
can saturate the lowest disentanglement threshold Dth, in
terms of her information gain and probability of correct
guessing. To this end, we have to consider in detail the
eavesdropping attack on the BB84 and the six-state pro-
tocols.
Such an investigation, however, is practically feasible
only in the context of attacks on a few qubits. As the num-
ber of attacked qubit-pairs increases the complete treat-
ment of the problem becomes intractable due to the large
number of independent parameters involved. In this sec-
tion we will focus on incoherent and two-qubit coherent at-
tacks. The disentanglement of Alice and Bob in the frame-
work of incoherent attacks has been extensively studied in
the literature [17,18,19,20,21]. In most of these studies,
however, Eve’s attack is by default optimized to provide
her with the maximal Shannon information. On the con-
trary, here we give Eve all the flexibility to adjust her
parameters in order to break entanglement between Alice
and Bob and simultaneously maximize her properties. Fi-
nally, for the two QKD protocols under consideration, we
are not aware of any related previous work on disentan-
glement in the context of coherent attacks.
4.1 BB84 protocol
4.1.1 Incoherent attacks
Incoherent attacks belong to the class of the so-called
single-qubit or individual attacks, where Eve manipulates
each transmitted qubit individually. To this end, she at-
taches a single probe (initially prepared in e.g. state |0E〉)
to each transmitted qubit and lets the combined system
undergo a unitary transformation of the form [13,37,38]
|0B〉 ⊗ |0E〉 →
√
F |0B〉 ⊗ |φ0〉+
√
D |1B〉 ⊗ |θ0〉,
|1B〉 ⊗ |0E〉 →
√
F |1B〉 ⊗ |φ1〉+
√
D |0B〉 ⊗ |θ1〉,(29)
with F and D being the fidelity and disturbance respec-
tively, while |φj〉 and |θj〉 are normalized states of Eve’s
probe when Bob receives the transmitted qubit undis-
turbed (probability F ) and disturbed (probability D), re-
spectively. Applying unitarity and symmetry conditions
on this transformation one finds that the states |φj〉 are
orthogonal to the states |θj〉 (j ∈ {0, 1}), while the over-
laps 〈φ0|φ1〉 and 〈θ0|θ1〉 are real-valued [13,37,38]. Thus,
an incoherent attack can be described by the four pa-
rameters satisfying Eqs. (16), (17) (18) and (19) with
H = −F 〈φ0|φ1〉 and G = −D〈θ0|θ1〉. In other words,
there are only two independent parameters and by fixing
one of them, say D, one is able to determine any prop-
erty of the attack. In Figs. 3, we present Eve’s optimal
information gain and probability of success in guessing
the transmitted qubit correctly as functions of the distur-
bance (solid line). The optimization is performed in the
usual way, i.e. for a fixed disturbance D, Eve’s mutual in-
formation with Alice is maximized [13,38]. It is also known
that such an optimized strategy disentangles the qubits of
Alice and Bob at D(1) ≈ 30% (vertical dotted line)[17],
which is well above Dth = 25%. Thus, the natural ques-
tion arises is whether, under the assumption of incoherent
attacks, Eve can saturate the lowest possible disentangle-
ment border Dth and if yes, at which cost of information
loss.
To answer this question, for a fixed disturbance D, we
calculated numerically all the possible values of G and H
which are consistent with the constraints (16)-(19) and
which yield a separable state of Alice and Bob. In general,
at any given disturbance there is more than one combina-
tion of values of G andH which fulfill all these constraints.
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Fig. 3. BB84 protocol — Incoherent attacks : (a) Eve’s proba-
bility of guessing correctly the transmitted message as a func-
tion of disturbance D. The solid line corresponds to an attack
that maximizes Eve’s probability of success in guessing, while
each square denotes the corresponding probability for an attack
which in addition, disentangles Alice and Bob at the specific
disturbance. (b) As in (a) but for Eve’s information gain. The
vertical dotted lines correspond to the solid curves, and denote
the disturbance D(1) ≈ 30% up to which Alice and Bob share
an entangled state. The vertical dashed lines denote the low-
est disentanglement threshold disturbance Dth = 1/4 which
can be attained in the context of general coherent attacks and
intercept-resend strategies.
For each of these combinations, we calculated Eve’s infor-
mation gain and her probability of correct guessing [13,
38]. The results presented as squares in Figs. 3, refer to
those combinations of parameters which, not only disen-
tangle the two honest parties for a particular disturbance
D, but which simultaneously maximize Eve’s property as
well. Clearly, for disturbances close to Dth, the two strate-
gies are not equivalent since they yield substantially dif-
ferent results. In other words, an optimal incoherent at-
tack that maximizes Eve’s information gain is certainly
not the one which achieves the lowest possible robustness
bound. Furthermore, our simulations show that saturation
of Dth = 1/4 is feasible at the cost of ∼ 4% less informa-
tion gain of Eve or equivalently at the cost of ∼ 7.44%
less probability of success in guessing.
4.1.2 Two-qubit coherent attacks
In a two-qubit coherent attack, Eve attaches one probe
to two of the qubits sent by Alice. Let |mB〉 with m ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3}, be the message sent from Alice to Bob in bi-
nary notation. The combined system then undergoes a
unitary transformation of the form [38]


|0B〉
|1B〉
|2B〉
|3B〉

 ⊗ |0E〉 → E ⊗


|0B〉
|1B〉
|2B〉
|3B〉

 , (30)
where E is a 4×4 matrix which contains normalized states
in the Hilbert space of Eve’s probe
E ≡


√
α |φ0〉
√
β |θ0〉
√
β |ω0〉 √γ |χ0〉√
β |θ1〉
√
α |φ1〉 √γ |χ1〉
√
β |ω1〉√
β |ω2〉 √γ |χ2〉
√
α |φ2〉
√
β |θ2〉√
γ |χ3〉
√
β |ω3〉
√
β |θ3〉
√
α |φ3〉

 .
The states φj , θj , ωj and χj denote Eve’s probe states
in cases in which Bob receives all the transmitted qubits
undisturbed, one qubit disturbed or both transmitted qubits
disturbed.
Applying unitarity and symmetry conditions on Eq.
(30), the problem can be formulated in terms of the fol-
lowing four mutually orthogonal subspaces [38]
Sφ = {φ0, φ1, φ2, φ3}, Sχ = {χ0, χ1, χ2, χ3},
Sθ = {θ0, θ1, θ2, θ3}, Sω = {ω0, ω1, ω2, ω3},
while all the overlaps between the various states within
each of these subspaces are real-valued. Thus, Eve is able
to infer with certainty whether Bob has received both
qubits undisturbed (Sφ), one qubit disturbed (Sθ,ω) or
both qubits disturbed (Sχ). These events occur with prob-
abilities α, 2β and γ, respectively. It can be shown that
a general coherent two-qubit attack can be described in
terms of five independent parameters [38]. The average
reduced density matrix for Alice and Bob is then of the
form (14), with F = α+β, D = β+γ, H = −(α〈φ0|φ1〉+
β〈θ0|θ2〉), G = −(γ〈χ0|χ1〉+β〈θ0|θ1〉), satisfying the con-
straints (16), (17), (18) and (19).
Compared to an incoherent attack, a two-qubit coher-
ent attack can improve the probability that Eve guesses
correctly the whole two-bit message sent by Alice to Bob
[38]. Eve’s optimal probability of success in guessing is
plotted in Fig. 4 (solid line), as a function of disturbance
D. This curve has been obtained by maximizing Eve’s
probability of success in guessing conditioned on a fixed
disturbance D. For such an optimal attack, we found nu-
merically that Alice and Bob share entanglement up to
disturbances of the order of D(2) ≈ 28% (dotted vertical
line). This is in contrast to the bound D(1) ≈ 30% at-
tained in an optimal incoherent attack. Furthermore, we
also found that Eve is able to saturate the lowest possi-
ble robustness bound (dashed vertical line), at the cost of
∼ 3% less probability of success in guessing. This loss of
Eve’s probability in guessing is substantially smaller than
the corresponding loss for incoherent attacks (∼ 7.44%).
Thus, it could be argued that a two-qubit coherent attack
which is optimized with respect to the probability of guess-
ing only, is very close to an optimal coherent attack which
also disentangles Alice and Bob at Dth = 1/4. The reason
is basically that in a two-qubit coherent attack each one
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Fig. 4. BB84 protocol — Two-qubit coherent attacks : Eve’s
probability of guessing correctly a two-bit transmitted message
as a function of disturbanceD. The solid line corresponds to an
attack that maximizes Eve’s probability of success in guessing
only, while each square denotes the corresponding probability
for an attack that, in addition, disentangles Alice and Bob at
the specified disturbance. The vertical dotted line corresponds
to the solid curve, and denotes the disturbance D(2) ≈ 28% up
to which Alice and Bob share an entangled state. The vertical
dashed line denotes the lowest possible disentanglement thresh-
old disturbance Dth = 1/4 that can be attained in the context
of general coherent attacks and intercept-resend strategies.
of the two independent macroscopic parameters G and H
can be expressed in terms of two different overlaps whereas
in incoherent attacks the corresponding dependences in-
volve a single overlap only. In a coherent attack Eve has
therefore more possibilities enabling her to push the dis-
entanglement border towards the lowest possible value,
while simultaneously maximizing her probability of guess-
ing correctly the transmitted message.
4.2 Six-state protocol
So far, we have considered incoherent and coherent at-
tacks in the context of the BB84 protocol where Eve’s at-
tack is determined by a set of two macroscopic parameters
(G,H). These two independent parameters give a consid-
erable flexibility to Eve since at a given disturbance there
exists a variety of physically allowed attacks. This fact is
also reflected in Fig. 1 where, for a specific disturbance,
Alice and Bob can be disentangled for different values of
H (and therefore of G).
In the highly symmetric six-state protocol, however,
the situation is much simpler. In fact, the high symme-
try of the protocol reduces significantly the options of an
eavesdropper since there is only one independent macro-
scopic parameter in our problem, namely H . Moreover,
the analysis of the attacks under consideration becomes
rather straightforward [39]. In particular, for incoherent
attacks G = −D〈θ0|θ1〉 = 0 which indicates that Eve has
full information about the disturbed qubits received by
Bob. However, as depicted in Fig. 2, at a given value of
D there is a unique value of H consistent with the laws
of quantum mechanics. It is determined by Eqs. (16) and
(28) [line (c) in Fig. 2]. Similarly, for the two qubit coher-
ent attack we have 〈χ0|χ1〉 = 〈θ0|θ1〉 = 0 and thus G = 0,
whereasH = −(α〈φ0|φ1〉+β〈θ0|θ2〉) = −(α−γ) = 2D−1.
As a result, for both incoherent and two-qubit coherent at-
tacks, the physically allowed attack is the one that max-
imizes Eve’s probability of guessing and simultaneously
disentangles Alice and Bob at a given disturbance. It is
sufficient for Eve therefore to optimize her attack with
respect to her probability of correct guessing in order to
disentangle Alice and Bob at the lowest possible distur-
bance.
5 Entanglement and intrinsic information
So far, we have discussed for both the four- and six-state
protocols the maximal disturbance up to which Alice and
Bob share entanglement. Clearly, this bound indicates that
in principle secret-key generation is feasible by means of
a quantum purification protocol. In this section we show
that, at least in the context of incoherent attacks, a two-
way classical protocol, the so-called advantage distilla-
tion protocol, exists which can tolerate precisely the same
amount of disturbance as a quantum purification protocol.
To this end, we adopt Maurer’s model for classical
key agreement by public discussion from common infor-
mation [3]. Briefly, in this classical scenario, Alice, Bob
and Eve, have access to independent realizations of ran-
dom variablesX,Y and Z, respectively, jointly distributed
according to PXY Z . Furthermore, the two honest parties
are connected by a noiseless and authentic (but otherwise
insecure) channel. In the context of this model, Maurer
and Wolf have shown that a useful upper bound for the
secret-key rate S(X ;Y ||Z) is the so called intrinsic infor-
mation I(X ;Y ↓ Z) which is defined as
I(X ;Y ↓ Z) = min
Z→Z¯
{I(X : Y |Z)},
where I(X : Y |Z) is the mutual information between the
variables X and Y conditioned on Eve’s variable Z, while
the minimization runs over all the possible maps Z → Z¯
[40].
For our purposes, we can link this classical scenario
to a quantum one. More precisely, the joint distribution
PXY Z can be thought of as arising from measurements
performed on a quantum state |ΨABE〉 shared between
Alice, Bob and Eve. We have, however, to focus on inco-
herent attacks where Eve interacts individually with each
qubit and performs any measurements before reconcilia-
tion. Thus, at the end of such an attack the three par-
ties share independent realizations of the random vari-
ables X , Y and Z. Accordingly, the resulting mixed state
after tracing out Eve’s degrees of freedom is of the form
(14) where H = −F 〈φ0|φ1〉 and G = −D〈θ0|θ1〉. It turns
out [18] that the random variables X and Y are symmet-
ric bits whose probability of being different is given by
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Prob[X 6= Y ] = D whereas Eve’s random variable consists
of two bits Z1 and Z2. The first bit Z1 = X ⊕2 Z shows
whether Bob has received the transmitted qubit disturbed
(Z1 = 1) or undisturbed (Z1 = 0). The probability that
the second bit Z2 indicates correctly the value of the bit
Y is given by
Prob[Z2 = Y ] = δ =
1 +
√
1− 〈φ0|φ1〉2
2
. (31)
As has been shown by Gisin and Wolf [18], for the sce-
nario under consideration secret key agreement is always
possible iff the following condition holds
D
1−D < 2
√
(1 − δ)δ. (32)
More precisely, one can show that if the above condition is
not satisfied, the intrinsic information vanishes whereas,
in any other case there exists a classical protocol that can
provide Alice and Bob with identical keys about which Eve
has negligible information. Such a protocol, for instance
is the so-called advantage distillation protocol which is
described in detail elsewhere [3].
In our case now, considering that Eve has adjusted the
parameters in her attack to disentangle Alice and Bob at
the lowest possible disturbance, Eq. (31) yields for the two
protocols
δ =
{
3+2
√
2
6 BB84 protocol
2+
√
3
4 six-state protocol.
Using these values of δ in Eq. (32) one then obtains bounds
that are precisely the same with the threshold distur-
bances for provable entanglement we derived in Section
3. In other words we have shown that, as long as Alice
and Bob are entangled, a classical advantage distillation
protocol is capable of providing them with a secret key,
provided Eve restricts herself to individual attacks only
(see also [20,21] for similar results).
This result is a manifestation of the link between quan-
tum and secret correlations in both four- and six-state
QKD protocols [22,23]. For the time being, the validity of
this equivalence between classical and quantum distilla-
tion protocols is restricted to individual attacks only. In-
vestigations of tomographic QKD protocols have shown,
however, that such an equivalence is invalid for coherent
attacks [41].
6 Concluding remarks
We have discussed provable entanglement in the frame-
work of the BB84 and the six-state QKD protocols under
the assumption of coherent(joint) attacks. In particular,
we have shown that the threshold disturbances for prov-
able entanglement are 1/4 and 1/3 for the four- and six-
state QKD protocols, respectively. Perhaps surprisingly,
these borders coincide with the disentanglement borders
associated with the standard intercept-resend strategy [42,
43]. Here we have shown, however, that even the most
powerful eavesdropping attacks (which are only limited
by the fundamental laws of quantum theory), are not able
to push these disentanglement borders to lower distur-
bances. In other words, for the two protocols under con-
sideration, any eavesdropping attack which disentangles
Alice and Bob gives rise to QBERs above 1/4 (BB84)
and 1/3 (six-state). Hence, for estimated disturbances be-
low these borders the two honest parties can be confident
(with probability exponentially close to one) that their
quantum correlations cannot be described in the context
of separable states and can be explored therefore for the
extraction of a secret key.
In particular, for the entanglement-based versions of
the protocols such a secure key can be obtained after ap-
plying an EPP which purifies the qubit pairs shared be-
tween Alice and Bob. Nevertheless, for the prepare-and-
measure forms of the protocols the situation is more in-
volved. To the best of our knowledge, the highest tolerable
error rates that have been reported so far in the context
of the prepare-and-measure BB84 and six-state schemes
are close to 20% and 27%, respectively [4,5]. These best
records are well below the corresponding threshold distur-
bances we obtained in this work. Thus, an interesting open
problem is the development of prepare-and-measure pro-
tocols which bridge the remaining gap and are capable of
generating a provably secure key up to 25% and 33.3%
bit error rates. In view of the fundamental role of en-
tanglement in secret key distribution such a development
appears to be plausible. For this purpose, however, con-
struction of new appropriate EPPs with two-way classical
communication, which are consistent with the prepare-
and-measure schemes, is of vital importance.
Furthermore, we have investigated the cost of infor-
mation loss at which an eavesdropper can saturate these
bounds in the context of symmetric incoherent and two-
qubit coherent attacks. We have found that for the highly
symmetric six-state scheme, there is always a unique eaves-
dropping attack which disentangles Alice and Bob at a
fixed disturbance (above 1/3) and simultaneously maxi-
mizes Eve’s information gain and/or probability of guess-
ing. For the BB84 protocol, however, the situation is sub-
stantially different. Specifically, an attack which maxi-
mizes any of Eve’s properties (information gain or proba-
bility of success in guessing) is not necessarily also the one
that yields the lowest possible robustness bound. In fact,
if Eve aims at reducing the robustness of the BB84 proto-
col she has to accept less information gain and probabil-
ity of correct guessing. Nevertheless, our simulations show
that for a two-qubit coherent attack this cost is substan-
tially smaller than the cost for an incoherent attack. We
conjecture therefore that, for coherent attacks on a larger
number of qubits, the strategy that maximizes Eve’s prob-
ability of success in guessing, is also the one that defines
the lowest possible disentanglement threshold.
In closing, it should be stressed that the bounds we
have obtained throughout this work depend on the post-
processing that Alice and Bob apply. In particular, they
rely on the complete omission of any polarization data
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from the raw key that involve different bases for Alice
and Bob as well as on the individual manipulation of each
pair of (qu)bits during the post-processing. In other words
only one observable is estimated, namely the disturbance
or QBER. If some of these conditions are changed, also the
threshold disturbances may change. In this context it was
demonstrated recently that with the help of entanglement
witnesses which are constructed from the data of the raw
key, the detection of quantum correlations between Alice
and Bob is feasible even for QBERs above the bounds we
have obtained here [22].
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